





PFRI VIEW SUDIPTO MUNDLE

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he Bihar election has been diagnosed ad infinitum: the arithmetic of alliances, back-ward vs forward castes, the divisive campaign, Nitish Kumar's record, the future of the lanata Dal (United)-Rashtriya Janata Dal-Con-gress alliance, the implications for govern-ance, etc. But the possibly far reaching implications of the election outcome for cooperative federalism have not received much attention.

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When proposed by the 14th Finance Commission (FFC) in December last year, the concept of cooperative federalism immediately gained great traction in policy discourse. It sat well with the Prime Minister's announcement early in his ten-ure that he and the chief ministers would together constitute the 'A' team, the 'Board of Directors' as it were, that would take India forward. But cooperative feder-alism possibly meant different things to different people. Except in one important respect, discussed further below, the concept largely remained an attractive sound

bite. Successive finance commissions had referred to the imbalance between the powers of state governments to raise reve-nues and their spending responsibilities. They had also pointed to the imbalance between the inter-governmental division of responsibilities. A major thrust of the FFC award was to address these imbalances. However, the FFC was also mindful of the Union government's own expenditure obligations, including projects (or pro-grammes) of national importance. These projects are located in different states, with varying conditions, and they may also overlap with state subjects. So, the states have to have a role in the design and implementation of such national projects. Noreover, these projects are actually implemented by state govern-ments as agents of the Union government. Clearly, the collective wisdom, experi-ence, and expertise of 29 state govern-Successive finance commissions had

ments plus the Union government for designing and implementing such projects is much greater than that of a sin-gle department in the Union government. Hence the need for cooperative federal-ism

Hence the need for cooperative federal-ism. The FFC report devoted a whole chap-ter to cooperative federalism and outlined a framework for it, leaving it to the Union and state governments to collectively work out the detailed architecture of the institution. The FFC also pointed to an existing institution, the inter-states coun-cil, that could serve as an ideal platform for such cooperation if suitably empow-ered as a permanent body under article 263 of the Constitution. A council of chief ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, with a secretariat consisting of officers with a secretariat consisting of officers from the states and the Union as well as domain experts could be a very powerful and effective body. Especially so if the institution is enshrined in law and placed outside the Union home ministry, where

it is currently located as a toothless entity that rarely meets. Unfortunately, this is

rarely meets. The current scenario of the FA source of th

key differences between the Planning Commission and the NITI Aayog. First, the Commission was primarily an instrument of the Union Government. In contrast, the NITI Aayog comprises a gov-erning council, chaired by the Prime Min-ister, in which all the chief ministers and lieutenant governors of Union territories are members. Also, its mandate explicitly requires the NITI Aayog "to evolve a shared vision of national development priorities, sectors and strategies with the active involvement of states..." and "to fos-ter cooperative federalism through struc-tured support initiatives and mechanisms with the states on a continuing basis, rec-ognising that strong states make a strong Union." Clearly, NITI Aayog is the plat-form chosen by the Union government to promote cooperative federalism. However, this platform has no role in the transfer and allocation of Union

the transfer and allocation of Union resources or 'Plan funds' to the states. That function has been taken over by the

ministry of finance. This is the second key differ-The current political scene is such that the centre will have to work in tandem with the states for major economic policy initiatives

ministry of finance. This is the second key differ-ence compared to the Planning Commission. In fact, the executive order that established the Aayog on 1 lanuary 2015 clearly states that it will be "an institution that serves as a think tank of the government." In other words, cooper-ative federalism has been limited to the sphere of an institution that has no operational or resource allocation role. Post-Bihar elections, this situation could change radically. There is now an are of contiguous opposition-ruled states, with a vast population, stretching from Delhi through Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to West Bengal. Several states in the North-east and South are also ruled by opposi-tion partice. Even state governments friendly with the Union government, or equidistant between National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the opposition, such as in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Odisha, are likely to join the opposition-ruled states in the Nates. Hence, the Union government will per-

force have to work in close cooperation with the states for any major economic policy initiative. This applies to land and labour, which are state subjects. It also applies to any national-level reform that requires legislation, and hence depends on an opposition-dominated Rajva Subha. It even applies to national programmes or policies that do not require legislation but will have to be implemented by the states, for example, power, roads, education or health. Reforms and public investment are

health. Reforms and public investment are urgent now to revive the private invest-ment cycle. The global growth scenario stays depressed, the collapse of commod-ity prices being a mixed blessing. Domes-tically, the growth estimate of 7.4%, based on the new gross domestic product num-here, correlinge to comfound attempts bers, continues to confound everyone Virtually all other indicators, barring indirect tax collections, suggest an anaemic economic outlook. Downside risks economic outlook. Downside risks include virtual stagnation in both exports and slow growth of bank credit, weak first quarter corporate performance, low industrial growth and the slowdown in agriculture due to a deficient monson. To revive the private investment cycle despite these downside risks, significant reforms, including goods and services tax and a public investment boost are essen-tial. As explained above, that can only happen in the present political environ-ment through close cooperation between the Union government and the states. Thus, there are strong political eco-rotive (etaeralism. The Modi government has two choices. It can fight the currents, and risk Boundering in continuous con-frontation with the states. Alternatively, it can ride the currents, institutionalise a system of genuine cooperative federalism, and use the system in partnership with the states to push through significant reforms and public investments pro-grams. With just over three years remain-ing for the general election in 2019, it is bigh time to take a call. include virtual stagnation in both exports

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